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Cues play important roles in individuals’ political decision-making, affecting how they 
vote, form issue attitudes, and process information.  These cues can take a range of forms, 
including partisan and ideological labels, referent endorsements, and candidate demographics.  
Partisan cues have received much attention in research on countries with long-standing party 
systems, such as the United States (Downs 1957; Huckfeldt et al. 1999; Kam 2005; Lau & 
Redlawsk 2001; Rahn 1993).  In these settings, voters use such cues to determine candidates’ 
policy stances, or they support copartisans based on psychological bonds to parties that are often 
passed down across generations (Green et al. 2002). 
Do voters in countries with newer party systems also use partisan cues in their political 
decision-making?  Following the U.S.-based literature, partisan cues might seem to have limited 
impact in such settings because parties may be too young to provide useful heuristics about 
policy or performance, and too evanescent to be the objects of psychological attachments.  As 
such, voters are presumed to focus more heavily on other attributes, such as distributional 
practices (Keefer & Vlaicu 2008); ethnicity or other ascriptive identities (Birnir 2007; Chandra 
2004; Ferree 2011; Posner 2005); or endorsements from key societal figures, such as traditional 
elites (Baldwin 2013; Koter 2013).   
Scholars have overlooked the potential importance of partisan cues in electoral decision-
making in systems with new parties (Bullock 2011; Samuels & Zucco 2014).  Our paper marks 
the first of which we aware to examine this.
 
  We present a theory that, even in systems in which 
major parties are young, voters may use partisan cues to assess candidates on a range of topics, 
such as ability to produce desirable economic or security outcomes, preferences in areas such as 
distribution and democracy, and electoral viability.  Notably, partisan labels can serve these 
functions even when few voters have established strong psychological bonds to young parties, 
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and when parties’ platforms are vague.  In short, partisan cues could be meaningful to voters, 
even in systems in which some parties are still in their infancy. 
We seek to fill this gap by examining the effects of partisan cues on vote choice in a 
context where such effects are especially unlikely: Uganda’s 2011 general election.  Three 
factors bias against our finding significant partisan cue effects here.  First, our outcome of 
interest is vote choice for real candidates, rather than support for unfamiliar policies or fictitious 
candidates.  In most studies of partisan cues, subjects have limited knowledge and weak attitudes 
about the object of the inquiry, and party label is often the only heuristic available.  In our study, 
subjects were asked to make a meaningful choice between familiar candidates in an environment 
where there were numerous alternate decision-making cues.   
Second, the precise timing of our study—after a months-long campaign and just days 
before an election—biased against the finding of significant partisan cue effects because many 
subjects had already decided on their favored candidates.  Partisan cues are likely to have real-
world implications if they can affect vote choice at the end of a campaign.  And third, the current 
system in Uganda was introduced in 2006, making the 2011 elections only the second time 
candidates had run under party banners.  To our knowledge, no study of party cue effects has 
focused on a system as young as Uganda’s. If partisan cue effects are identifiable in Uganda, 
then such heuristics are probably meaningful to voters in a much broader range of contexts than 
previously considered.   
We conducted an experiment in which we varied Ugandans’ exposure to partisan cues via 
an important, yet overlooked medium for the transmittal of cues: electoral ballots.  Subjects were 
assigned to treatment conditions where they were given mock ballots that included or excluded 
partisan identifiers, and then asked to mark their preferred candidates in presidential, 
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parliamentary, and local contests.  This design enhances external validity, in that it used real 
candidates, was conducted in close proximity to an actual election, and administered treatments 
using a medium that often transmits partisan cues (i.e., ballots).   
Our findings indicate that partisan cues did affect vote choice in Uganda.  Subjects whose 
ballots contained partisan cues were more likely to vote for major parties, less likely to support 
independent candidates, more likely to cast straight-ticket votes, and more likely to match their 
votes with their self-reported partisan identity.  These effects were substantively as well a 
statistically significant; for example, the predicted probability of straight-ticket voting is 16% 
higher for those subjects who saw partisan cues compared to those who did not.  These strong 
effects challenge the conventional view that partisan cues are less consequential in nascent party 
systems (Brader et al. 2013; Bullock 2011; Greene 2011; Magaloni 2006; Merolla et al. 2007) 
and suggest a need to broaden our conceptualization of the mechanisms through which partisan 
cues might affect electoral decision-making.    
 
A Theory on the Utility of Partisan Cues for Voting in New Party Systems 
Research on partisan cues has focused almost exclusively on well-established party 
systems.  Scholars of the U.S., in particular, have examined the effect of partisan cues on vote 
choice, opinion formation, information processing, and affective responses (Chaiken 1980; 
Goren 2005; Goren et al. 2009; Kam 2005; Lau et al. 2008; Petty & Cacioppo 1986; Rahn 1993).  
In these contexts, well-established parties are more likely to have stable reputations and 
programmatic cores from which their elites do not deviate significantly (Snyder & Ting 2002), 
while voters themselves are socialized, through cross-generational communications, to 
internalize identification with parties (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1969; Downs 1957; 
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Fowler & Kam 2007; Gerber & Green 1998; Green et al. 2002; Jennings et al. 2009).  Party 
labels are deemed influential because they act as information shortcuts or because they activate 
long-standing psychological attachments. 
In contrast, studies of newer party systems have generally avoided examining the 
importance of partisan cues (Samuels & Zucco 2014).  Given that individuals often use heuristics 
when information is scarce or costly (Tversky & Kahneman 1974), we might expect that cues 
would be especially influential in newer party systems, where paucity of political information 
and non-habituated political behavior make landscapes harder to navigate.  However, scholars 
have focused on other types of heuristics—such as ascriptive identity (Birnir 2007; Chandra 
2004; Conroy-Krutz 2013; Ferree 2011; Posner 2005) and clientelistic distribution (Keefer & 
Vlaicu 2008)—and eschewed study of partisan cues.  Partisan cues are presumed to hold limited 
utility where parties avoid taking policy positions or are ideologically incoherent (Bleck & van 
de Walle 2011, 2013; Brader et al. 2013; Conroy-Krutz & Lewis 2011) and have yet to establish 
reputations based on previous terms in office (Greene 2011).
4
  In short, one might presume that 
citizens do not know or care about parties in such cases, and thus partisan cues will have minimal 
or no effects. 
We theorize that partisan cues could affect voters’ decision making in new party systems 
by affecting perceptions of candidates’ abilities, preferences, and viability.  First, party labels can 
signal which candidate has more capacity to deliver favorable outcomes.  If a candidate is 
identified as sharing partisanship with a well-regarded national executive, that candidate is likely 
to benefit, vis-à-vis an opposition-affiliated or independent competitor.  On the other hand, a 
candidate who shares partisanship with a president whose performance is judged to be lacking is 
                                                 
4
 For a review of these arguments, see Lupu & Stokes (2010). 
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likely to be harmed, vis-à-vis opponents, by the inclusion of labels.
5
  Additionally, candidates 
whose partisan labels indicate they have access to nationally (or, in some cases, locally)
 6
 
powerful actors might be viewed as possessing greater capacity to deliver patronage. 
 Second, partisan cues can affect citizens’ expectations about candidates’ preferences in 
key areas, such as patronage and democracy.  Party leaders’ regional or ascriptive identities 
might signal the distributional preferences (i.e., whom should be targeted) of the party as a whole 
(Chandra 2004).  Furthermore, the delivery of largess in campaigns, during which party symbols 
and colors are displayed, might be interpreted as an indication of the party’s future commitment 
to recipients.  And in systems emerging from authoritarianism, even new parties may indicate 
distinct democratic credentials based on events before, during, and after the transition.  Parties 
often develop reputations as advocates for democracy and human rights, perpetrators of 
authoritarian abuses, or harbingers of (dis)order during the period immediately preceding or 
                                                 
5
  Even in situations of information scarcity, most citizens are likely to have formed an opinion 
on the president’s performance.  And voters should be able to make these assessments even if the 
president has only been in power for a short period of time.  For example, research on economic 
voting finds citizens focus primarily on election-year performance, suggesting that they do not 
rely on long periods of time to assess incumbent competence (Achen & Bartels 2004; Alesina et 
al. 1993; Fair 1978; Healy & Lenz 2014; Kiewiet 1983; Kramer 1971). 
6
 In situations in which local officials play significant roles in determining patronage 
distributions, the voter might consider it advantageous to elect a local representative who shares 
the partisanship of whatever party is dominant locally.  Note that this party might not match the 
party dominant nationally. 
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following the establishment of new regimes.  In short, voters can use partisan labels to assess 
candidates’ preferences, even when parties themselves have vague, indistinguishable platforms. 
Finally, partisan cues can provide insight about candidates’ electoral viability.  If party 
labels indicate that a candidate is a member of a party that has recently performed well, that 
candidate is more likely to be seen as viable, and therefore more worthy of the voter’s 
consideration.  Conversely, affiliates of poorly performing parties and political independents (in 
many contexts) will be viewed as less viable, and likely harmed by the inclusion of labels.
7
 
Further, voters might assume that the party label will attract other partisan-minded voters.  Thus, 
party affiliation might signal the top contenders and deter sincere voting for low-viability 
candidates (McKelvey & Ordeshook 1972). 
These factors suggest that party labels may influence voting even in new party systems.  
Importantly, our theory about how party labels can affect vote choice does not depend on 
citizens’ development of psychological attachments to parties,8 nor on parties having clear and 
                                                 
7
  Here, the party’s performance at the relevant level is important.  For example, in assessing a 
candidate’s viability for a legislative seat, the voter will likely consider how the candidate’s party 
performed locally, rather than nationally. 
8
 It is possible that voters in such settings will have psychological attachments to certain elites, 
and vote for associated parties accordingly.  In fact, we expect that sentiments towards elites, 
many of whom were politically or socially important prior to forming a party, constitute the basis 
for party-citizen connections in many countries with nascent party systems.  This mechanism, 
however, is distinct from that proposed in the US-based literature, which focuses on 
psychological attachments to parties, rather than to leaders who hold central positions in them. 
We discuss this mechanism further with regard to the Ugandan case. 
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distinct platforms.  If party labels carry meaning, then partisan cues could alter citizen choices by 
providing new information about candidates’ affiliations, which could in turn help voters assess 
candidates’ abilities, preferences, and viability.  Further, partisan cues could prime citizens to 
consider candidates’ partisanship, rather than candidates’ personal attributes, when assessing 
electoral options.  In theory, either mechanism—learning or priming—could increase party-
based voting.
9
 
While there are many studies on the development of party systems (for a review, see 
Ferree et al. 2014),
10
 few have examined whether partisan affiliation is meaningful to voters’ 
decision-making.  We know of only a few studies specifically on the effects of partisan cues in 
newer party systems, most of which examine how cues affect policy preference, rather than vote 
choice (Brader & Tucker 2012; Brader et al. 2013; Merolla et al. 2007; Samuels & Zucco 2014).  
We are aware of only one study that examines the effects of cues on party-based voting: an 
experiment testing varying electronic voting designs in Argentina (Calvo et al. 2009; Katz et al. 
2011).  In this study, however, party names and logos were equally apparent across all treatment 
conditions, while the prominence and accessibility of candidate names, among other things, 
varied across treatments.  In other words, the study evaluates whether the presence of candidate 
                                                 
9
 We return to this point in the discussion. 
10
 Studies have focused on Africa (Arriola 2013; Brambor et al. 2007; Elischer 2013; Kuenzi & 
Lambright 2001; LeBas 2011; Lindberg 2007; Mozaffar et al. 2003; Riedl 2014), Eastern Europe 
(Kitschelt et al. 1999; Moser 1999), Latin America (Mainwaring & Scully 1995; Roberts & 
Wibbels 1999), and Asia (Chhibber & Kollman 1998; Hicken & Kuhonta 2014).  
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cues, rather than partisan cues, affects party-based voting.
11
  We know of no research specifically 
on how partisan cues affect vote choice in new party systems.
12
   
 
Research Design 
To adjudicate between the expectation of no effect and our hypothesis that partisan cues 
increase party-based voting, we conduct an experiment testing the effects of partisan cues on 
vote choice in a party system that was, at the time of our study, only five years old: Uganda.  The 
experiment was conducted using mock ballots and held just days before Uganda’s 2011 general 
election.  Subjects were assigned to one of five ballot types; these ballots contained varying 
combinations of visual and textual elements, such as party names, party symbols, and candidate 
photographs.  Our theory predicts that subjects who received ballots containing partisan cues 
(i.e., party names or symbols) would be more likely to vote based on candidate partisan 
affiliation than their counterparts who received ballots including no such cues. 
                                                 
11
 The treatments’ complexity also makes it difficult to isolate the potential effects of cues on 
decision-making processes from mechanical effects of different vote technologies on ballot 
marking.  The treatments varied considerably in the logistical challenges that subjects faced 
when trying to locate their favored candidate from over 70 candidates and 24 parties.   
12
 Additionally, the party system in our case, Uganda, is younger than those studied by others, 
including Mexico (Merolla et al. 2007), Brazil (Samuels & Zucco 2014), Argentina (Calvo et al. 
2009; Katz et al. 2011), and former Communist systems of Russia and Poland (Brader & Tucker 
2012; Brader et al. 2013). 
Page 19 of 75
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/comppolstud
Comparative Political Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
11 
 
 
In this section, we discuss our use of mock ballots for administration of treatments, the 
selection of the Ugandan case and the research site, the experimental design, and subject 
recruitment. 
 
Ballots and Partisan Cues 
Ballots are an important—and understudied—potential source of cues affecting voters’ 
decision-making.  Policy makers often suggest that ballots include myriad textual and visual 
elements to facilitate informed and autonomous voting.  These elements can include information 
about candidates, such as their photographs or occupations, or about parties, such as their names 
or symbols.  Visual elements, such as photographs and symbols, are especially recommended for 
countries where voters have less education, information, and voting experience (ACE Electoral 
Knowledge Network 2011; Reynolds & Steenburgen 2006; Smith et al. 2009).   
Despite widespread use of such identifiers, we lack systematic evidence about their 
effects on voting, particularly outside of established democracies (ACE Electoral Knowledge 
Network 2007; Katz et al. 2011; Reynolds & Steenburgen 2006).
13
  While proponents of the 
inclusion of such elements argue that doing so encourages participation and reduces voter error, 
such recommendations fail to consider that they could themselves affect voter preferences.  
Candidate photographs could, for example, shift support in favor of more attractive contenders, 
or to those who appear to be coethnics of the voter ([Working paper by authors]).  And, as we 
                                                 
13
 For observational analyses of partisan cues on ballots in established democracies, see Meredith 
& Grissom (2010); Schaffner & Streb (2002); Shaffner et al. (2007); and Welch & Bledsoe 
(1986).  For experimental studies, see Buckley et al. (2007); Klein & Baum (2001); and 
Reynolds & Steenbergen (2006). 
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suggest in this paper, partisan cues could affect voter preferences, even in countries with new 
party systems. Ballots provide the last stimuli that might affect voters’ decision-making 
processes and could therefore have sizeable effects on vote outcomes, even though cue effects 
are often ephemeral.  In the experiment described below, we assigned subjects to mock ballots 
containing different textual and visual elements, and thus measure these elements’—and, more 
specifically, partisan cues’—effects on voting. 
 
Case Selection:  Uganda 
Two considerations guided our selection of Uganda as the experimental site:  its recent 
history of including variable textual and visual elements on ballots, and its status as a country 
with a new party system.  On the first count, the fact that Ugandan ballots have changed occurs 
in recent elections means that conditions that included or excluded various elements would all be 
plausible conditions for most voters, thus increasing the experiment’s external validity.  
Candidates’ photographs, for example, appeared on ballots starting in the 1994 Constituent 
Assembly elections, while party names and symbols were not included until 2006. 
The absence of partisan labels from Ugandan ballots prior to 2006 stems from the fact 
that parties had long been prohibited from electioneering in the country.  Upon seizing power in 
1986, President Yoweri Museveni established a unique “no-party democracy,” ostensibly to 
diminish the ethnicization of politics (Museveni 1997). Multiparty competition was not restored 
until 2006, following the public’s approval in a referendum the previous year, meaning that 2011 
marked only the second election under Uganda’s current multiparty regime.  The main parties 
have been Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) and the opposition Forum for 
Democratic Change (FDC), which was founded in 2004 as a breakaway from the NRM.  
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Together these two main parties won 96.7% of the presidential vote in the election preceding our 
experiment (2006).
14
  Ugandans have had limited time to develop psychological attachments to 
parties, and parties’ identities are still in flux.15   
Despite the unlikelihood of strong, psychological attachments to parties of the type often 
passed down over generations in countries like the United States, we expected that partisan 
labels would affect Ugandans’ assessments of candidates’ abilities, preferences, and viability—
and thus their electoral choices.  First, politics in Uganda are centered on a strong, personalistic 
leader (Carbone 2008; Rubongoya 2007; Tripp 2010), and elections are seen by some as 
referenda on President Museveni’s perceived leadership in economics, security, and resource 
distributions (Conroy-Krutz & Logan 2012).  When candidates’ partisan affiliations are 
highlighted, voters who are dissatisfied with recent government performance will be more likely 
to punish candidates attached to Museveni’s NRM, determining that they, too, will be less 
capable.  Conversely, those pleased with Museveni will be more likely to favor his copartisans.  
Further, candidates not affiliated with the NRM, which distributes significant patronage 
                                                 
14
 Two parties that field candidates pre-date the current multiparty era—the Democratic Party 
(DP), founded in the mid-1950s, and the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC), founded in 1960—
but neither enjoys significant support.   
15
 Further, parties in Uganda are not simply coterminous with ethnic identities.  The respective 
leaders of the NRM and FDC in recent elections, Museveni and Dr. Kizza Besigye, are both 
from closely related ethnic groups in the Western Region, and both parties draw significant 
electoral support from all regions of the country (save the Western Region, where the NRM is 
overwhelmingly dominant). 
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nationally (Carbone 2008; Izama & Wilkerson 2011; Tripp 2010), might be deemed less able to 
deliver goods.
16
   
Second, partisan labels can signal candidate preferences, in areas such as resource 
distributions and democratic development.   Voters in Uganda’s Northern Region, for example, 
have long felt marginalized by the Western-dominated government; NRM affiliation might 
signal a candidate’s disinterest in providing patronage to such voters, while an FDC label might 
signal interest in changing the distributional status quo.  And voters who prefer a strong leader—
despite (or perhaps because of) undemocratic tendencies such as cracking down on media houses 
and stacking the Electoral Commission (EC) with ruling-party loyalists (Izama & Wilkerson 
2011; Mwenda & Tangri 2005; Tripp 2010)—may be more likely to support candidates 
identified as copartisans of the president.  Those uncomfortable with such practices will be more 
attracted to those identified with the opposition party.   
Finally, partisan cues likely signal candidate viability in Uganda.  The NRM is clearly a 
dominant party, having won 59.3% of the presidential vote in 2006, and in most circumstances a 
candidate for parliamentary or local office is likely to seem more viable when identified as an 
NRM partisan, given the party’s electoral popularity in many regions and its significant resource 
advantages.   However, the FDC has claimed substantial support as well, winning 37.4% of the 
                                                 
16
 Alternatively, voters might consider candidates’ abilities to access resources from local 
governments, which have some ability to affect distributions (Lambright 2011).  Parties other 
than the NRM control some local governments, especially in urban areas and regions such as the 
North. 
Page 23 of 75
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/comppolstud
Comparative Political Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
15 
 
 
2006 vote.  And in areas where the FDC is popular,
17
 an FDC label likely signals viability.  On 
the other hand, minor-party candidates and independents will likely be seen as less electable.  
The most-established minor parties—the DP and UPC—won a combined 2.4% of the 2006 
presidential vote and only claimed pluralities at a combined seven polling stations in the entire 
country.  Independents, who are present in many races and who often have formerly been 
affiliated with a major party, are usually disadvantaged by a lack of access to parties’ 
organizational and resource capacities. While pluralities of candidates for various important 
offices were independents, only a small number of winners were.
18
  When partisan labels are 
present, minor-party and independent candidates are more likely to be overlooked in favor of 
second-best choices deemed more likely to win. 
In summary, Uganda was an ideal site for research, because of its history of varying 
ballot design and the youth of its party system.  Like in most of Africa, and in new party systems 
elsewhere, political competition in Uganda takes place on an uneven playing field,
19
 dominated 
by a single powerful leader, whereby numerous subsidiary political actors vie for support (van de 
Walle 2003).  As in other young party systems, there are a number of potential candidate-centric 
                                                 
17
 The FDC won a plurality of presidential votes at 6,699 polling stations (33.9% of the total) in 
2006. 
18
 Independents constituted 41.8% of candidates for Parliament and 40.7% for district 
chairmanships, but they won only 12.6% of parliamentary seats and 12.5% of district 
chairmanships. 
19
 In 2011, Uganda was among 46% of the sub-Saharan countries ranked as partly free, 
according to Freedom House’s evaluation. Only 19% of the countries in the region were 
considered free at that time, while 35% were considered not free at all (Freedom House 2011).  
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characteristics that might affect vote choice (e.g., ethnicity, region of origin, status, past 
performance, and resource endowments).  We posit that, when cued, partisan affiliation becomes 
more likely to play an important role.   
The experiment was conducted in one parliamentary constituency—Soroti County, which 
is a rural area in the country’s northeast.  Soroti was selected for logistical reasons—an author 
was already collecting data there—and because its demographics and ethnically diverse 
candidate pools facilitated study of the effects of ballot design on ethnic voting, as well (as 
reported in [working paper by co-authors]). 
Soroti is an opposition-supporting area in a country with a dominant party.  Majorities 
there have supported the FDC in recent presidential elections, and the party has had great success 
recently claiming parliamentary seats and district chairmanships. Many residents have evinced 
displeasure with the president’s performance in terms of the economy,20 democracy,21 and 
security.
22
  While President Museveni was expected to win handily in 2011, non-NRM 
candidates for Soroti’s down-ballot races had credible chances of winning office.23    
                                                 
20
 In a pre-election survey conducted by Afrobarometer (January 2011), 44% of Soroti County 
respondents said that the country’s economy was “very” or “fairly bad.”  35% of Ugandans 
responded similarly.  
21
 56% of Soroti respondents in the Afrobarometer said that they were dissatisfied with 
democracy in Uganda (vs. 28% country-wide).   
22
 The NRM saw its fortunes in Soroti decline significantly between elections in 2001—when  
Museveni won a near plurality (43.5%) and the party took the local parliamentary seat—and 
2006.  This decline is likely attributable, at least in part, to a Lord’s Resistance Army attack on 
Soroti in 2003, which left many residents with a sense that the central government was not 
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Our thesis should apply equally to pro-opposition areas as to pro-government areas, and 
equally to individuals who support the opposition or government.  Party labels will help voters 
assess candidates’ abilities, preferences, and viability regardless of which party is more popular.  
The main difference will be in which party benefits the most from the partisan cues.  In pro-
opposition areas and among opposition supporters, party cues should benefit the opposition.  In 
pro-government areas and among government supporters, partisan cues should benefit the 
government.  Thus, we would expect that the FDC would be the main benefactor in Soroti, but 
not uniformly across all voters.
24
  In sum, we expect that voters in Soroti will use partisan cues to 
assess candidates, even though the locally dominant party is quite young. 
                                                                                                                                                             
offering them adequate protection.  Overall, 50% of Soroti residents in the Afrobarometer said 
they were dissatisfied with Museveni’s performance (vs. 18% nationally).   
23
 We cannot determine whether a vote for an FDC candidate in a down-ballot race is expressive 
or strategic.  Few likely believed that the FDC would win a parliamentary majority.  However, 
most citizens are concerned with constituency services rather than law-making.  It is not clear 
whether voters would believe that electing NRM or FDC candidates in down-ballot races would 
be more likely to generate office holders capable of distributing resources.  On the one hand, 
NRM-affiliated officials likely have more access to the party’s substantial largess, while on the 
other, FDC-affiliated officials might have more access to resources available to local 
government, in which the opposition has a much more substantial presence.   
24
 We cannot directly test the effect of partisan cues in pro-government areas given our data.  
However, our evidence from Soroti is suggestive in that the total vote for the NRM is unaffected 
by partisan cues for our sample as a whole, but NRM candidates did gain votes from NRM 
supporters when partisan cues were present.   
Page 26 of 75
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/comppolstud
Comparative Political Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
18 
 
 
 
Experimental Design 
Subjects were assigned to one of five treatments, which varied according to the inclusion 
or exclusion of partisan cues, as well as a cross-cutting candidate photograph treatment.
25
  All 
five include candidates’ names.  Treatment 1 (the control) included no other information.  
Treatment 2 included party names, while Treatment 3 included party names and symbols.
26
  
Treatment 4 included photographs, and Treatment 5 included all elements:  party names and 
symbols, and candidate photographs.  Table 1 shows the conditions analyzed in this paper by 
ballot features.  For each treatment, the information provided accurately portrays the actual 
candidates.  Treatment 5 most closely mimics real Ugandan ballots.
27
  Images of mock ballots 
are available in Figure 1.   
                                                 
25
 We designed the experiment to examine the effects of photos on voting in addition to testing 
the effects of partisan cues (see: [Working paper by authors]).  In regression analyses here, we 
control for the photo treatment.   
26
 The EC requires that independent candidates select an object from a pre-designated list, on a 
first-come, first-served basis.  Independent presidential candidates can design their own symbols, 
subject to EC approval.  The object appears on the ballot in the same location as would a party 
symbol.  We include (or exclude) the object (e.g., soccer ball, chair, etc.) in the same way that 
we include (or exclude) party symbols. 
27
  The experimental ballots were similar in size, shape, and design to official ballots, although 
they were also clearly marked as samples and lacked the EC logo that appears on official ballots.  
In addition, subjects were reminded before the ballot exercise and at the end of the survey that 
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[Table 1 goes around here] 
[Figure 1 goes around here] 
After demographic data were collected, subjects were asked to mark one mock ballot for each of 
four real-world contests:  president, Member of Parliament, district women’s Member of 
Parliament,
28
 and district chairperson.
29
  Candidates from the two major parties, at least one from 
a minor party, and several independents contested each race.
30
  Each subject received the same 
type of ballot for each contest.  Subjects marked ballots in private, without assistance from 
research staff or others, and placed their ballots in an envelope.
31
  Following this, subjects were 
asked a series of additional questions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
the ballots they had “cast” were not official, and those wishing to vote would have to go to the 
appropriate polling station on designated election days.   
28
  Uganda is divided into 112 districts, each of which elects one woman MP.  
29
  Each district elects a chairperson, which is the highest local-government position.  All offices, 
with the exception of president, are elected by plurality in single-member districts.  The president 
is elected by majority, though no presidential election has ever required a second round. 
30
 The minimum number of candidates in a contest was six (district chair) and the maximum was 
nine (MP).  See Appendix A for a list of candidates from each contest, including their current 
and former partisan affiliation, ethnicity, and percent of support amongst subjects in the control. 
31
 These envelopes contained no identifying information about the subject, but were marked with 
a serial number that allowed later matching to the subject’s completed questionnaire. 
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Subject Recruitment 
Subjects were selected via multistage sampling.  Enumeration Areas (EAs), as delineated 
by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics, were first randomly selected, with EAs’ likelihood of 
selection proportionate to their population as of the last census (2002).  Enumerators then 
selected households via a random-walk pattern, and individuals within selected households were 
recruited using a Kish grid.
32
 Subjects had to be at least eighteen years old, Ugandan citizens, 
and able to communicate in at least one of the three survey languages (English, Iteso, and 
Kumam); they did not have to be registered voters or literate.  Most selected gave consent and 
completed the survey (93.5%).   
Balance checks suggest that our generated samples were statistically equivalent on 
selected observables across treatments.  These checks were conducted with variables that we 
expected would not be affected by the treatments, but which could theoretically affect party-
                                                 
32
 Questionnaire numbers were used to select subjects (N=897) based on Kish grid requirements, 
as well as to assign treatment conditions.  An unanticipated interaction occurred, whereby some 
positions on the Kish grid did not have equal probabilities of being assigned to each treatment.  
A detailed description of the issue and our strategies for addressing it are available in Appendix 
B.  For all analyses in this paper, we include only subjects from positions on the Kish grid that 
had an equal probability of being assigned to comparison conditions (N=529).  This maintains 
the experimental design, but does cost considerable statistical power and limits external validity, 
in that the analysis population is not representative of the population at the within-household 
level.   The results hold when using an alternate strategy of including all subjects (and thus a 
representative sample) and controlling for factors associated with subject selection and treatment 
assignment (Appendix C).   
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based voting, including demographics (sex, age, wealth, ethnicity, education); 2006 presidential 
vote; need for assistance when casting ballots in the previous election; political knowledge; and 
access to news (via radio, newspaper, television).
33
  Appendix D reports results for these checks.  
The only variables for which there are significant differences across treatments are sex and 
newspaper readership; however, there is no statistically significant difference on either variable 
when comparing treatments that contained partisan cues to those that did not.  These checks 
suggest that observed differences in outcomes between groups are attributable to the treatments, 
rather than potential confounders.   
 
External Validity 
Our case selection and research design enhance external validity in four respects.  First, 
as previously discussed, most Ugandans have cast ballots with and without partisan identifiers; 
this means that ballots of either type would be within the realm of most subjects’ real-world 
experiences.  Second, our ballots included real-world candidates then campaigning for office.  
Studies utilizing hypothetical candidates might be biased towards finding larger cue effects, 
given that subjects will have very little information about the candidates other than the available 
cues.  Third, we conducted the experiment just days prior to the actual elections.  Presidential 
and parliamentary elections were held on 18 February, while local elections were held five days 
later; our experiment was conducted between 10 and 17 February.  Again, conducting the study 
earlier in, or even prior to, the campaign would likely bias effects upward, since subjects would 
have had less information about candidates and have to rely more on ballot-provided cues.  The 
                                                 
33
 Details on these variables and the reasons for their inclusion in balance checks are reported in 
Appendix D. 
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number of undecided voters, who are more easily swayed, is also likely higher early in a 
campaign.  Any study attempting to determine whether partisan cues affect voting, then, should 
ideally be held as close to the election as possible.  Finally, our subjects filled out their mock 
ballots in secret and used separate papers for each of the contests studied, a procedure similar to 
the one that Ugandans actually face at polling stations.  This design represents a particularly hard 
test of the hypothesis that partisan cues can affect vote choice in new party systems, given that 
we are evaluating support for real-world candidates at the end of a campaign in a party system 
that was then only five years old. 
 
Measurement 
To test the effect of partisan cues on voting, we compare the votes recorded on our mock 
ballots for those treatments that contain both party name and symbol (3 and 5) against those that 
do not contain any information about parties (1 and 4).
34
  We cannot directly observe whether 
voters considered party affiliation when marking ballots, so we look for observable implications 
of decision-making criteria.  We operationalize party-based voting in three ways: 1) increased 
voting for major-party candidates and decreased voting for minor-party candidates and 
independents; 2) straight-ticket voting; and 3) voting in accordance with party identification.
35
  
                                                 
34
 We discuss additional analyses involving Treatment 2 in the discussion section. 
35
 The descriptive statistics, coding rules, and question wording for the outcome measures 
described in this section can be found in Appendix E. 
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For each, we code the dependent variables to indicate the dimensions of vote choice we wish to 
test based on the attributes of the candidates selected by each subject.
36
  
We first posit that major-party candidates benefit from decision-making that weights 
party considerations more heavily, while minor-party candidates and independents lose votes.  
Major parties have more adherents, so they gain support when voters consider party.  
Furthermore, when party is emphasized, strategic voters are more wary of wasting votes on 
minor-party candidates and independents.  Schaffner et al. (2007), working in the two-party U.S. 
system, find that the majority party benefits from partisan elections, and Katz et al. (2011), 
working in Argentina, find that minor parties benefited from candidate-centric displays.  In sum, 
we expect that partisan cues increase voting for major-party candidates and decrease voting for 
minor-party candidates and independents.  This first operationalization requires three measures: 
Major Parties, Minor Parties, and Independents measure the total number of votes for major-
party, minor-party, and independent candidates, respectively.
37
  All range from 0 to 4.   
Our second expectation is that party-based decision-making manifests in higher rates of 
straight-ticket voting (Kimball 2003).  Partisan cues should generate greater consistency, such 
that more voters choose candidates from the same party for all contests.  Voters may choose 
                                                 
36
 Alternate approaches, such as use of interaction terms, would be unwieldy given that there are 
thirty-one candidates across the four races; seven parties, plus independent candidates; and 
multiple outcome measures of interest.  The primary models presented here include all four 
races, and code all unmarked ballot contests as zero. 
37
 Minor parties included the DP, UPC, People’s Development Party, People’s Progressive Party, 
and Uganda Federal Alliance.  The most popular of the minor parties in 2011, the UPC, received 
just 1.3% of the presidential vote in Soroti. 
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candidates from a previously favored party for all contests, or the party affiliation of a single 
favored candidate in a salient contest may anchor decisions for less-salient ones.  Straight-Ticket 
is a binary variable coded 1 if a subject voted for candidates from the same party in all four 
contests, and 0 otherwise. 
Third, we expect that voter partisan identification exerts a stronger influence on vote 
choice when partisan considerations are emphasized.  Partisan cues might provoke partisans to 
“come home,” therefore increasing the match between the partisan identification of voters and 
the partisanship of the candidates they select.  Party-ID Match measures the total votes for 
candidates from a subject’s preferred party.  Our main formulation of this measure includes only 
those subjects who identified a party to which they “feel close.”  The measure sums across the 
four contests and ranges from 0 to 4.   
Collectively, these three measurement approaches provide a methodologically and 
theoretically sound basis for evaluating whether partisan cues increase party-based voting.  The 
third operationalization is the most common conception of party-based voting, while the first two 
are strongest with respect to causal inference.  The first two are based solely on how subjects 
marked the ballots, and we can feel confident that differences between groups reflect differences 
in voting.  The third has advantages with respect to construct validity, but it requires a post-
treatment measure of partisan identification, which makes interpretation of causal effects more 
difficult.
38
  Consistent results across the three approaches strengthen our conclusions about the 
causal effects of partisan cues on party-based voting. 
                                                 
38
 A closer match between vote choice and party ID in partisan cue conditions could be because 
cues caused partisans to vote according to their partisan preferences, or because cues caused 
subjects to report feeling close to the party of their favored candidates.  Theoretically, the former 
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Analysis and Results 
Across all three dimensions, the results indicate that partisan cues affect vote choice.  
Table 2 displays the results of regression analyses of the effect of partisan cues (Treatments 3 
and 5) compared to no partisan cues (Treatments 1 and 4), controlling for the cross-cutting 
feature (candidate photos).  We use logistic analysis for the binary measure of straight-ticket 
voting and ordered logistic analysis for others, where outcomes range from 0 to 4.  Figure 2 
graphs the means and 95% confidence intervals for subjects who were and were not exposed to 
partisan cues.  The estimated effects of partisan cues on voting are strong and consistent. 
[Table 2 goes around here] 
[Figure 2 goes around here] 
First, partisan cues significantly increased votes for major-party candidates and 
significantly decreased votes for independent candidates, as expected.  The substantive size of 
the effects is notable, especially for a new party system (Bullock 2011).  The estimates indicate 
that the probability of voting for major-party candidates in all contests increased by 13% when 
subjects were exposed to partisan cues.  We do not see the expected decline in support for minor 
parties, probably because of a floor effect.  There were no viable minor-party candidates in the 
down-ballot contests,
39
 so there was little room for loss of votes due to the inclusion of party 
identifiers.  Instead, the evidence suggests that the inclusion of partisan cues discouraged 
                                                                                                                                                             
is more likely, but we cannot rule out the latter.  We opted for a post-treatment measure of party 
ID because a pre-test mentioning parties may have biased how subjects marked their ballots. 
39
 Amongst subjects assigned to the control, only 6% of votes in the women MP race, 11% the 
MP race, and 3% in the chairperson race were for minor-party candidates.   
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subjects from voting for independent candidates.  Partisan cues decreased the probability of 
voting for any number of independent candidates by 18%.  Partisan cues seem to have induced 
subjects to vote for major-party candidates instead of independents.  
Second, considerably more voters expressed consistent party preferences when partisan 
identifiers were on the ballot.  Subjects who saw partisan cues were 16% more likely to vote 
straight-ticket than those who did not.     
Third, self-identified partisans were significantly more likely to vote for copartisan 
candidates in the presence of partisan cues.  The probability that a subject voted for all the 
candidates from his/her preferred party was 11% higher when partisan cues were included on the 
ballot than when they were not.  These results suggest that party attachments exert greater 
influence on vote choice when partisan cues are present. 
In sum, there is considerable evidence that partisan cues affect voting, even in a party 
system as young as Uganda’s.  The results shown in Table 2 are robust to an alternate 
methodological approach; Appendix F shows comparison of means test results conducted 
separately for Treatment 1 versus 3 (those without photographs) and for Treatment 4 versus 5 
(those with photographs).
40
 
Furthermore, these results are robust to different coding decisions and alternate 
specifications of the model (see Appendix G).
41
  Our results are not due to a selection bias based 
                                                 
40
 The results are consistent with only one exception: the difference of means between 
Treatments 4 and 5 for party-ID match is not significant (p=.14).  Appendix F also shows the 
means and standard deviations for each treatment.  
41
 The descriptive statistics, coding rules, and question wording for the robustness checks can be 
found in Appendix H. 
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on who chose to vote.  The treatment has no effect on subjects’ willingness to mark the ballot, 
nor on the total number of contests marked.  Additionally, our coding rule for missing votes does 
not affect our conclusions.  The foregoing analyses include all possible responses from all 
subjects, with missing ballot choices coded as zero, but the results do not change notably if we 
drop subjects who failed to mark their ballots at all, or if we drop subjects who failed to mark 
one or more contests on the ballot.  
Our findings remain unchanged when we examine alternate formulations of the outcome 
variables.  For major-party voting, the key results remain significant if we include only the most 
popular party in Soroti (the FDC) instead of the two most popular parties.  For straight-ticket 
voting, the results hold if we create a more nuanced measure.  We summed the total number of 
down-ballot vote choices with the same partisan affiliation as the presidential vote choice.
42
   
Partisan cues significantly predict the degree of party matching between presidential and down-
ballot votes.  Furthermore, the results for straight-ticket voting are the same if we include only 
those subjects who could vote straight ticket based on their presidential pick.  Only the FDC, 
NRM, and UPC fielded candidates in all four contests.  Among only those subjects who voted 
for the FDC, NRM, or UPC presidential candidates, partisan cues significantly increased 
straight-ticket voting.  The results also hold for party-ID voting if we restrict our sample to those 
who could vote for copartisans in all four contests (i.e., FDC, NRM, or UPC partisans).  Finally, 
disaggregating our analyses to evaluate the presidential, MP, women MP, and chairperson 
contests separately shows that our results are not driven by just one contest.  Interestingly, we 
                                                 
42
 An individual coded as 3 would have voted for candidates from the same party in all races.  
One coded as 2 would have voted for a candidate for one down-ballot race whose partisanship 
did not match his or her presidential pick, etc. 
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find that the partisan cues have no effect on the presidential race and that cue effects are stronger 
if we consider only the three down-ballot contests.
43
   
In sum, we find strong and robust evidence that the inclusion of partisan cues on ballots 
increased party-based voting.  The strong effects of partisan cues on vote choice are striking 
given the newness of the party system in Uganda. 
 
Discussion 
In this section we provide suggestive evidence about the nature of the change in voting 
and the possible mechanism motivating the increase in party-based voting.  Our goal here is to 
use available evidence to probe the nature of the processes that might be generating the observed 
effects on vote choice.
44
  
 
Partisan Cues Decrease Votes for Former Copartisans and for Coethnics 
The results of additional analyses suggest that partisan cues led subjects to switch votes 
in predictable ways:  namely, they privileged 1) their party’s current candidates over 
independents who were formerly copartisans, and 2) copartisan ties over coethnic bonds.  First, 
as noted above, partisan cues resulted in significantly higher support for major-party candidates, 
and lower support for independents.  The types of independents most often abandoned by 
                                                 
43
 This between-race variation is consistent with literature suggesting that cues are less 
influential in contests of the highest salience (Nicholson 2012), but with only four races we are 
unable to test effects of contest-level characteristics such as salience. 
44
 The descriptive statistics, coding rules, and question wording for these analyses can be found 
in Appendix I. 
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subjects in the presence of partisan cues were those who were formerly copartisans of the 
subject.  Nearly all independent candidates in Soroti were previously affiliated with a major 
party (Appendix A).  Results from an ordered logit model (Table 3, Column 1) indicate that 
partisan cues significantly decreased the number of former copartisan independents supported 
(b=-.84, SE=.25, p=.00).
 
  In other words, partisan cues increased subjects’ likelihood of voting 
for the current flag-bearer of their favored party over former affiliates of their favored party. 
[Table 3 goes around here] 
Second, partisan cues also seem to affect ethnic voting.  Soroti County is an ethnically 
divided constituency, with 69.1% identifying as Iteso and 29.1% as Kumam (2002 census).  If 
partisan cues increase party-based voting, we should expect the presence of such cues to increase 
willingness to support candidates from another ethnic group in instances in which copartisanship 
and coethnicity cross-cut.  The district chairperson contest provides an excellent opportunity to 
test this expectation, given that the two major-party candidates came from different ethnic 
groups.
45
  In that contest, George Michael Egunyu, a Kumam, was the NRM candidate, while 
Daniel Ediau of the Iteso group stood for the FDC.  Logistic regression analyses indicate that 
partisan cues increased voting for non-coethnic candidates when including our entire subject 
population (b=.47, SE=.20, p=.02) (Column 2, Table 3), as well as when the analysis is limited to 
voters who were cross-pressured, such that they could either vote for a copartisan or a coethnic 
major-party candidate, but not both (b=.64, SE=.32, p=.04) (Column 3, Table 3).  Though we 
cannot be certain that these changes in ethnic voting are due to vote switching between major-
party candidates, the results suggest that subjects were more likely to consider party, and less 
                                                 
45
 In the MP race, both major-party candidates were Kumam, while all candidates in the district 
women’s MP race were Iteso.  None of our subjects had coethnic presidential candidates. 
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likely to consider other possible heuristics, when partisan cues were present.  We are hesitant to 
generalize on the basis of findings from this particular election, but these results are intriguing 
and suggest a need for further research on how partisan cues affect ethnic voting. 
 
Causal Processes: Priming, not Learning 
What causal process might be responsible for the strong effects of partisan cues?  Much 
of the literature, especially on new party systems, suggests that cues are influential because they 
provide voters with novel information about candidates (Birnir 2007; Chandra 2004; Conroy-
Krutz 2013; Ferree 2011; Posner 2005).  Voters might care about, but be unaware of, candidates’ 
partisan affiliations.  Partisan cues could thus provide voters with actionable new information to 
deploy when deciding their vote.   
Priming is an alternate causal mechanism to learning (Iyengar & Kinder 1987; Lenz 
2009).  Partisan cues might increase the salience of party characteristics over candidate 
characteristics, and affect vote choice accordingly.  Voters might be reminded of the importance 
of parties in securing and distributing resources, and coordinating to achieve favorable economic 
and security outcomes.  They also might be more likely to consider how officials tend to govern 
as part of organized groups, rather than as individuals. For example, a voter who would have 
supported a coethnic candidate, if left to focus on candidate traits, might instead vote for 
someone whose partisan label vividly signals their stance for or against President Museveni.  Or, 
as another example, a voter who would have selected the best-educated administrator for local 
office might be provoked by partisan cues to prioritize candidates’ relationships with those who 
control party and state coffers.  And, partisan cues might remind voters that party is a significant 
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determinant of whether individual candidates are viable, thus leading them to vote strategically, 
even if individual-level traits suggest the candidate should be popular. 
Our evidence suggests that information is not the causal mechanism generating the 
partisan cue effects we find.  A priming mechanism is far more consistent with the evidence.
46
  
To evaluate whether certain ballot cues increased subjects’ knowledge of candidate partisanship, 
thus affecting their vote choices, we asked subjects to identify the partisanship of all twenty-
three candidates running for MP, women MP, or district chair.  After marking their ballot and 
putting it in an envelope, subjects were shown unmarked ballots of the type matching their 
treatment condition and asked about the partisanship of the candidates.  In other words, subjects 
did not have to recall information from when they marked the ballot because they were looking 
at the assigned ballot treatment while answering the questions.  The variable Know Partisanship 
All totals the number of candidates whose party affiliation was correctly identified.  Regression 
analysis of partisan cues’ effects on knowledge of candidate partisanship yields insignificant 
results (b=-.29,  SE= .59, p=0.62) (Column 4, Table 3).
47
 
                                                 
46
 Evaluating causal mechanisms is a difficult task with respect to causal inference (Green et al. 
2010).  We provide suggestive evidence by examining whether our experimental treatments are 
associated with the hypothesized mechanism. 
47
 Because subjects might ignore information about candidates who are not of interest, we also 
evaluate a less-demanding criterion for learning.  Know Partisanship Voted totals the number of 
correctly identified party affiliations only for the three candidates that the subject marked on the 
ballots.  The results here are also insignificant (b=-.09, SE= .18, p=0.62) (Column 5, Table 3).  
Our findings for both outcomes are not sensitive to the coding of non-responses.  And we see no 
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Although we expect that partisan cues do improve voter knowledge in some contexts and 
under some conditions, the evidence suggests that they did not do so here.  Even though we 
presume that most voters are aware that the bus and the key are the symbols of the NRM and 
FDC, respectively, given the ubiquity of those parties’ paraphernalia, voters were probably 
already significantly knowledgeable about major-party candidates by the time of our study, at the 
end of a long campaign.  On average, subjects in the control identified the affiliation of 4.4 out of 
6 (73%) major-party candidates, suggesting a ceiling effect.  And while knowledge of 
independents’ and minor-party candidates’ affiliations was much lower—on average, 6.3 out of 
17 (37%)—matching English-language words and symbols to party names requires certain skills 
and prior knowledge that our subjects might not have possessed.  Perhaps subjects were unable 
to make sense of the symbols and labels for independent and minor-party candidates, especially 
given that most symbols were selected just prior to official campaigning.  Subjects might not 
have known, for example, that a soccer ball or radio signifies that the candidate is an 
independent, rather than a member of some obscure party seeking to appeal to youth or music 
lovers, or that the lantern represents the tiny Progressive People’s Party.   
Analysis of an additional treatment provides further support for the idea that partisan cues 
affect voting through a priming, rather than learning, mechanism.  In Treatment 2 we included 
only the name of the party, but not the party symbol.  This allows us to examine whether the 
effect of partisan cues is mostly due to the provision of written information or the visual imagery 
of the party symbol.  For this analysis we restrict our sample to those who have at least some 
formal education, because we want to be confident that the English-language party names and 
                                                                                                                                                             
evidence that the partisan identifiers increased knowledge about former partisans who are now 
independents (b=-.08, SE=.34, p=.81). 
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acronyms could be understood.  If learning is the primary mechanism, then we expect the full 
effect of the partisan cues to be evident when we add the party name, and there should be no 
additional influence from also including the symbol.  If priming is the mechanism, then the 
insignia and colors of the party symbol could be influential, even when they provide no novel 
information, since visual images are more attention-grabbing and stimulating than text (Graber 
1996; Mitchell & Olson 1981; Schill 2012; Zillmann 2006). 
The evidence most clearly supports priming, not learning (Appendix J).  A comparison of 
Treatments 1 (control) and 2 (party name) for each of the five outcomes shows that providing 
textual information had no significant effect on voting, even though we feel confident that those 
included in the analysis could read the party acronyms, if not the names.  However, when 
comparing Treatments 2 (party name) and 3 (party name and symbol) we find that there was a 
significant effect just from adding the visual image, even though subjects in both treatments 
could presumably read the party name.  Those who saw the symbol were significantly more 
likely to vote for major parties (p=.01); less likely to vote for independents (p=.03); and more 
likely to vote in line with their party ID (p=.01).  They were also more likely to vote straight 
ticket, but not significantly so (p=.23).  It seems that even in the presence of complete 
information, the party symbols altered vote choice, most likely by increasing the salience of 
party affiliation.  Furthermore, the changes are nearly identical in magnitude to those found in 
the tests of the partisan cues together, suggesting that the full effect of the partisan cues comes 
from the symbols.  
Our findings with regards to causal mechanism have important implications.  We do not 
intend to argue based on this experiment that learning is never a cause of partisan cue effects.  
Instead, we hope to encourage scholars to reconsider their assumptions about causal mechanisms 
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underlying cue effects.  Scholars of the developing world in particular have too often assumed 
that cue effects are due to information acquisition without considering information-processing 
theories.  Direct empirical tests of learning, priming, or alternate mechanisms underlying cue 
effects are extremely rare (Lenz 2009).  Our results suggest scholars should be attentive to a 
broader range of mechanisms through which partisan cues alter attitudes and behaviors, and 
should seek to evaluate theorized processes empirically. 
Importantly, the policy and normative implications are quite different if the behavioral 
changes from partisan cues are the result of what people learn as opposed to how they decide 
(Lenz 2009).  Practitioners recommend including ballot information (especially visual images 
like party symbols and candidate photos) under the assumption that this helps voters overcome 
knowledge deficits and select preferred candidates (ACE Electoral Knowledge Network 2011; 
Reynolds & Steenburgen 2006; Smith et al. 2009).  We find no evidence that partisan cues 
altered voting by facilitating informed choice.  Instead, cues may themselves shape preferences 
through priming.  Given the proximity of exposure to ballots and vote choice, subtle cues on 
ballots can have large effects on vote outcomes, even if their influence on attitudes is ephemeral. 
 
Conclusion 
Numerous studies indicate that voters in countries with established party systems rely on 
partisan cues to streamline their electoral decision-making.  However, only a handful of scholars 
have examined the effects of partisan cues in new party systems, and none have studied vote 
choice as outcomes.  The paucity of scholarship on partisan cues in such settings is likely 
attributable to researchers’ expectation that partisan affiliation is of limited utility in new party 
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systems.  Voters there are assumed to utilize other cues, such as candidates’ ascriptive identity or 
regional ties. 
We theorize that, even in new party systems without historical legacies, partisan cues can 
influence voters because they affect judgments about candidates’ capabilities, preferences, and 
viability.  First, voters can use partisan cues to assess candidates’ capabilities in areas such as 
economic development and physical security.  When labels emphasize candidates as copartisans 
of a ruler, those satisfied with that leader’s performance are more likely to assess his or her 
copartisans as similarly capable.  Dissatisfied citizens, on the other hand, are likely to punish 
candidates when cues highlight that they are copartisans of the incumbent.  And voters might 
conclude that candidates whose partisan identity suggests that they are connected to powerful 
individuals have greater capacity to deliver patronage.  Second, voters can use partisan cues to 
discern candidates’ preferences in areas such as goods distribution and democratic development. 
Namely, partisan labels can help voters discern which candidates share a well-known leader’s 
general preferences, and which do not.  Third, partisan cues might signal candidate viability.  
Therefore, partisan labels can affect vote preferences even when parties are too young to 
establish psychological ties with voters or offer distinct party platforms.  In sum, parties might 
become meaningful to voters, and partisan cues can affect political decision-making, very soon 
after the establishment of new party systems. 
We tested the effects of partisan cues on voting in Uganda when multiparty political 
competition was only five-years old, and partisan cue effects would seem especially unlikely.  
Subjects were asked to indicate their support for real-world national- and local-level candidates 
on mock ballots that included (or excluded) party identifiers.  The experiment was conducted just 
days prior to the actual election using procedures similar to those used at actual polling stations, 
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thus enhancing the external validity of the study.  The study provides an extremely rigorous test 
of the partisan cue thesis given that we examine the influence of a subtle cue on vote choice for 
real candidates at the end of a campaign in a multiparty system that had been in existence for 
such a short time.  
Our experiment demonstrates that voters in new party systems do, in fact, use partisan 
cues in their electoral decision-making; the presence of partisan identifiers increased party-based 
voting.  Subjects who received ballots with party names and symbols were more likely to 1) vote 
for major parties; 2) avoid voting for independents; 3) cast straight-ticket ballots; and 4) vote for 
copartisans.  Furthermore, the presence of partisan cues did not help subjects accurately identify 
the partisanship of candidates, and the party names alone did not affect vote choice, which 
suggests that effects are not due to learning. Instead, the visual images of the party symbols 
altered voting, likely because they primed partisan considerations.  These results challenge the 
assumption that cue effects in new party systems mainly occur through information provision, 
rather than through the activation of alternate decision-making criteria.  
Party experts need to broaden their considerations of where, how, and why partisan cues 
affect outcomes such as vote choice.  The literature established through examination primarily of 
the United States provides insights into the types of cues that voters in myriad types of 
environments use, but the mechanisms at work are likely different in newer party systems than 
they are in established ones like the U.S.  Our findings suggest a need for further research into 
the magnitude of partisan cue effects on attitudinal formation and behavior, and the mechanisms 
through which these effects occur, in a broader range of contexts. 
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Table 1: Treatment Conditions by Ballot Elements 
 
  Party Name 
  no yes yes 
  Party Symbol 
  no no yes 
Pictures 
no 1 2 3 
yes 4  5 
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Table 2: Effects of Partisan Cues on Voting 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
  
 
Major party Minor party Independent Straight ticket Party-ID match 
      
      
Partisan Cues 0.60*** 0.03 -0.71*** 0.87*** 0.63** 
 
(0.18) (0.27) (0.19) (0.25) (0.20) 
      
Photographs -0.10 -0.49 0.31 -0.69** -0.21 
 
(0.17) (0.28) (0.19) (0.25) (0.19) 
      
Constant 
   
-1.55*** 
 
    
(0.22) 
 
      
Cut Points -1.80*** 1.56*** -0.21 
 
-1.45*** 
 
(0.19) (0.22) (0.16) 
 
(0.19) 
      
 -1.26*** 3.44*** 1.52*** 
 
-0.65*** 
 (0.17) (0.35) (0.18) 
 
(0.18) 
 
     
 -0.33* 4.76*** 3.83*** 
 
0.33 
 (0.15) (0.60) (0.38) 
 
(0.17) 
 
     
 1.02*** 5.87*** 5.93*** 
 
1.53*** 
 
(0.16) (1.02) (1.01) 
 
(0.19) 
      
N 429 429 429 429 340 
Model ologit ologit ologit logit ologit 
      
Notes: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates followed by standard errors in parentheses.   
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, based on two-tailed tests.  Outcome variables are: total votes 
for major-party, minor-party, and independent candidates; straight-ticket voting, and total votes 
for candidates from favored party.  The outcomes include votes in the presidential, MP, women 
MP, and chair contests.  Models 1 and 2 include all subjects.  Model 3 includes only partisans. 
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Table 3: Nature of Vote Choice, and Knowledge as a Possible Mechanism 
 
      
  
All  
subjects 
Cross-pressured 
subjects 
  
      
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Vote for 
independents 
who had been 
copartisans 
Vote for non-coethnic  
in chairperson contest 
Know partisan 
affiliation of 
all candidates 
Know partisan 
affiliation of 
vote choices 
      
      Party Cues -0.84*** 0.47* 0.64* -0.29 0.09 
 
(0.25) (0.20) (0.32) (0.59) (0.18) 
   
   
Photos 0.26 -0.15 -0.30 -0.47 -0.14 
 
(0.25) (0.20) (0.32) (0.59) (0.18) 
   
   
Constant 
 
-0.67*** 0.04 10.23***  
  
(0.17) (0.27) (0.50)  
      Cut Points 0.66*** 
 
  -1.35*** 
 
(0.20) 
 
  (0.17) 
      
 
2.70*** 
 
  -0.64*** 
 
(0.29) 
 
  (0.16) 
           0.36* 
     (0.16) 
      
N 324 424 167 429 429 
Model ologit logit logit OLS ologit 
      Notes: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates followed by standard errors in parentheses.   
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, based on two-tailed tests.  Outcomes are: (1) total votes for 
independent candidates who previously were members of the subject’s favored party in the MP, 
women MP, and chair contests; (2 and 3) vote for a non-coethnic chairperson candidate; (4) total 
number of candidates whose partisan affiliation the subject correctly identified from all 23 
candidates in the MP, women MP, and chair contests;  and (5) total number of candidates whose 
partisan affiliation the subject correctly identified from only those candidates for whom the 
subject voted in the MP, women MP, and chair contests.  Model 1 includes only partisans.  
Model 2 includes all Iteso and Kumam subjects.  Model 3 includes only subjects who could vote 
for either a coethnic or a copartisan chairperson, but not both.  Models 4 and 5 include all 
subjects. 
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Figure 1: Images of Treatment Features for MP Contest 
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Figure 2: Means and 95% Confidence Intervals for Vote Outcomes by Exposure to Partisan Cues  
 
 
Votes for Candidates with Party Affiliation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Dots represent mean number of votes, or proportion of votes, by ballot types.  Lines represent 95% confidence intervals.  The outcomes include votes in 
the presidential, MP, women MP, and chair contests.  Major party, minor party, and independents are the sums of votes for each type of candidate; the measures 
range from zero to four.  Straight-ticket vote is a binary outcome coded 1 if subject voted for candidates from the same party and 0 otherwise.  Party ID match is 
the mean number of votes for candidates from a subject’s preferred party; the measure ranges from zero to four. 
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Appendix A:  Candidate Information 
Contest Candidate Party Former 
Party 
(if IND) 
Ethnicity % of 
Support 
(Control 
Condition) 
President Kizza Besigye FDC  Bakiga 45.9 
Abed Bwanika PDP  Baganda 1.1 
Beti Olive Kamya UFA  Baganda 2.2 
Samuel Lubega IND DP Baganda 0 
Norbert Mao DP  Acholi 0.6 
Yoweri Museveni NRM  Banyankole 37.7 
Olara Otunnu UPC  Luo 1.6 
Jaberi Bidandi Ssali PPP  Baganda 0.6 
MP Samuel Anyolo IND NRM Iteso 7.1 
Simon Peter Ebitu IND FDC Kumam 2.2 
Vincent I. Enomu NRM  Kumam 26.8 
John Lule IND FDC Iteso 6.0 
Engirot Lawrence Okae UPC  Iteso 3.3 
Raphael Okoropot DP  Iteso 5.5 
Peter Omolo FDC  Kumam 33.3 
William Opit IND NRM Iteso 3.3 
Jimmy Oriokot PPP  Iteso 1.1 
Women’s MP Grace Abuin UPC  Iteso 4.9 
Elizabeth Adecho IND NRM Iteso 3.8 
Rachel Frances Adyango IND NRM Iteso 9.8 
Leah Jesca Amigo IND NRM Iteso 4.4 
Joyce Ijala IND FDC Iteso 2.2 
Ruth Ikuna IND FDC Iteso 14.2 
Julian Fede Iseet NRM  Iteso 16.4 
Angelline Osegge FDC  Iteso 34.4 
District Chair Daniel Ediau FDC  Iteso 16.9 
 George Michael Egunyu NRM  Kumam 44.3 
 Leonard Otekat Ekapu IND NRM Iteso 6.0 
 George William Okwaput IND None Iteso 5.5 
 Napoleon Martina Oliba UPC  Iteso 2.7 
 Jorem Obicho Opian IND NRM Iteso 10.4 
Party abbreviations:  DP (Democratic Party), FDC (Forum for Democratic Change), IND (Independent), NRM 
(National Resistance Movement), PDP (People’s Development Party), PPP (People’s Progressive Party), UFA 
(Uganda Federal Alliance), UPC (Uganda People’s Congress) 
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Appendix B: Interaction between Kish grid selection of subjects and treatment allocation 
 
A Kish grid was used to select individuals at the household level.  The Kish grid uses a 
pre-assigned table of random numbers and is often used because it is a simple way to generate a 
representative sample, especially where enumerators lack access to random number generators 
on site.  The instructions and Kish grid that appeared on our questionnaire are reproduced below.  
Household members were listed in order of age, and then the last digit of the questionnaire was 
used to identify which individual on the list was to be interviewed. 
The treatment conditions were also assigned based on the last digit of the questionnaire.  
Questionnaires ending in 4 and 8 were randomly assigned to Treatment 1, those ending in 2 and 
7 to Treatment 2, those ending in 6 and 0 to Treatment 3, those ending in 5 and 1 to Treatment 4, 
and those ending in 3 and 9 to Treatment 5.   
After the fact, we realized that the overlap in the two procedures created an unanticipated 
interaction, such that some positions on the Kish grid did not have equal probabilities of being 
assigned to each treatment.  We respond to this issue in two ways.  The first, which we use for 
the analyses presented in the text, maintains the experimental design by excluding observations 
that did not have equal probabilities.  The second, which we present as a robustness check in 
Appendix C, maintains the full sample in a non-experimental design and controls for factors 
related to the treatment assignment.  All the findings hold regardless of the strategy used. 
 
Experimental Strategy 
The first strategy restricts the analyses to those individuals who had an equal chance of 
being assigned to comparable treatments by virtue of their position in the Kish grid.  This 
approach maintains the experimental design, but does cost us considerable statistical power, in 
that it reduces the number of observations in the analyses by about 50%.  It also limits external 
validity, in that the analysis population is not representative of the population at the within-
household level.  Kish grid placement is determined by the number of individuals, and age 
rankings, within a household, so some demographics were more likely to be included than 
others.  For example, subjects in single-person households are more prevalent in our analysis 
than in the total subject population, and subjects are about 4 years older on average than those 
not selected.  The gender composition of the population included in our analysis is not 
significantly different than that of the total subject population. 
We describe in greater detail how we determined who should be included in the analysis 
for the comparison used most often in the paper:  that of no partisan cues (Treatments 1 and 4) 
compared to partisan cues (Treatments 3 and 5).   
1. Single-member households: All individuals had an equal chance of being assigned to 
Treatments 1, 4, 3, or 5 and were included in the analysis.   
2. Two-member households: All individuals had an equal chance of being assigned to 
comparable treatments with and without party cues, and were included in the 
analysis.  Individuals listed first on the Kish grid (i.e., the oldest) had an equal 
chance of being assigned to Treatment 1 (questionnaires ending in 4 or 8) or 
Treatment 3 (questionnaires ending in 6 or 0).  Individuals listed second on the Kish 
grid (i.e., the youngest) had an equal chance of being assigned to Treatment 4 
(questionnaires ending in 1 or 5) or Treatment 5 (questionnaires ending in 3 or 9).   
3. Three-member households: Individuals listed first on the Kish grid (i.e., the oldest) 
had an equal chance of being assigned to Treatment 1 or 3 if their questionnaires 
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ended in 4 or 0, and only those individuals were included.  Individuals occupying 
other spaces on the Kish grid did not have an equal chance of being assigned to 
comparable treatments with and without partisan cues, and were excluded from the 
analysis.  Note that his means that all of the second- and third-oldest members in 
these households were excluded.   
4. Four-member households: Individuals listed first on the Kish grid had an equal 
chance of being assigned to Treatment 4 or 5 if their questionnaires ended in 1 or 9, 
and only those individuals were included.  Individuals occupying other spaces on the 
Kish grid did not have an equal chance of being assigned to comparable treatments 
with and without party cues, and were excluded.   
5. Five-member households: None of the individuals in these households had an equal 
chance of being assigned to comparable treatments, and all were excluded.   
6. Six-member households: Individuals listed first on the Kish grid had an equal chance 
of being assigned to Treatment 1 or 3 if their questionnaires ended in 4 or 0, and 
only those individuals were included.  Individuals occupying other spaces on the 
Kish grid were excluded. 
7. Seven-member households: None of the individuals in these households had an 
equal chance of being assigned to comparable treatments and all were excluded.   
8. Eight-member households: Individuals listed third on the Kish grid had an equal 
chance of being assigned to Treatment 4 or 5 if their questionnaires ended in 1 or 9, 
and only those individuals were included.  Individuals occupying other spaces on the 
Kish grid were excluded. 
9. Nine-member households: None of the individuals in these households had an equal 
chance of being assigned to comparable treatments, and all were excluded. 
10. Ten-member households: There were no ten-member households. 
 
Observational Strategy 
The second strategy uses the full sample and includes controls for those attributes that are 
related to subjects’ location on the Kish grid and thus their selection into the study and 
assignment to treatments.  We include dichotomous variables for household size and the 
subject’s age ranking in the household (which is the same as the list order on the Kish grid).  The 
findings are similar to those included in the body of the paper.  The findings are also similar if 
we control, instead, for age and sex, which are the two observable characteristics that are 
unbalanced in the full sample.  The results of these two models are presented in Appendix C.   
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RESPONDENT SELECTION - KISH GRID; 
In order to determine whom I should interview from this household. Can you please tell me the names and ages of all the 
adults aged 18 years and above who have/are living here consecutively for the last 6 months and are not visitors. 
 
1.   LIST ALL ADULTS AGED 18 AND ABOVE LIVING IN THE HOUSEHOLD AND THEIR AGES FROM THE 
OLDEST TO THE YOUNGESTIN SECTIONS A & B  BELOW. 
 
2.   TAKE THE LAST DIGIT OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER AND FIND THE SAME NUMBER IN TABLE 1 BELOW. 
 
3.   LOOK ALONG THE ROW OF THE LAST PERSON IN THE LIST. WHERE THIS MEETS THE COLUMN OF THE 
LAST DIGIT OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER IS THE NUMBER OF THE PERSON TO BE INTERVIEWED. 
 
4. REFER BACK TO THE LIST OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS AND ASK TO SPEAK TO THE PERSON WHOSE NUMBER 
IS THE SAME AS THE ONE YOU HAVE TAKEN OUT OF THE KISH GRID. IF THAT PERSON IS NOT AT HOME, YOU 
MUST ARRANGE TO CALL A SECOND AND THIRD TIME TO INTERVIEW THAT INDIVIDUAL. IF HE/SHE IS NOT THERE 
ON THE THIRD OCCASION, YOU SHOULD SELECT ANOTHER ADULT IN THE HOUSEHOLD BY TAKING THE NUMBER 
IN THE KISH GRID DIRECTLY ABOVE THE NUMBER OF THE PRESELECTED PERSON ON EVEN NUMBER DATES OR 
DIRECTLY BELOW ON ODD NUMBER DATES. IF THAT PERSON IS NOT AVAILABLE, GO TO ANOTHER HOUSEHOLD 
AND RECORD DETAILS ON CONTACT SHEET. 
 
NAMES AGE LAST DIGIT ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 
            
1.  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2.  2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 
3.  1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 
4.  1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 
5.  4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 
6.  4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 
7.  3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 
8.  3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 
9.  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 
10.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
            
Treatments assigned [not included in instructions] 4 2 5 1 4 3 2 1 5 3 
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Appendix C: Effects of Partisan Cues on Voting with Full Sample and Controls 
   1  2 3 
 
 
Major party Minor party Independent 
Straight  
ticket 
Party-ID  
match 
 
      
Partisan Cues 
 
 0.61*** -0.08 -0.65***  0.89***  0.63*** 
 
(0.15) (0.22) (0.16) (0.21) (0.16) 
 
     
Photographs 
 
-0.33* -0.15 0.23 -0.54** -0.15 
 
(0.15) (0.22) (0.16) (0.21) (0.16) 
Number of individuals in  
household eligible to 
participate in study 
2 0.00 -0.64 0.11 0.61 0.16 
 
(0.22) (0.34) (0.24) (0.32) (0.25) 
3 0.07 -0.26 -0.05 0.63 0.11 
 
(0.24) (0.35) (0.26) (0.36) (0.27) 
4 -0.04 -0.27 0.05 0.47 -0.20 
 
(0.26) (0.37) (0.27) (0.38) (0.28) 
5 0.46 -0.34 -0.01 1.17** 0.24 
 
(0.32) (0.46) (0.34) (0.43) (0.34) 
6 -0.66 0.37 0.59 0.00 -0.32 
 
(0.65) (0.88) (0.76) (.) (0.69) 
7 0.06 -0.51 0.17 2.45* 0.99 
 
(0.83) (1.06) (0.93) (1.11) (0.85) 
8 -1.75 1.20 4.04** 0.00 -1.03 
 
(1.17) (1.60) (1.39)   (.) (1.21) 
9 -0.92 -0.02 0.25 2.63 -1.31 
 
(1.39) (1.75) (1.64) (2.30) (1.52) 
Subject’s age rank in  
household listed from 
oldest to youngest 
2 0.19 -0.14 0.00 -0.07 -0.06 
 
(0.19) (0.30) (0.20) (0.25) (0.20) 
3 0.16 0.50 0.16 -0.06 -0.09 
 
(0.27) (0.37) (0.28) (0.35) (0.29) 
4 -0.18 0.76 0.14 -0.59 0.21 
 
(0.33) (0.43) (0.36) (0.50) (0.35) 
5 0.47 1.87 -0.90 -1.46 0.30 
 
(0.95) (1.11) (1.14) (1.77) (0.97) 
6 -0.15 -0.50 -0.40 0.00 -0.44 
 
(0.98) (1.44) (1.17) (.) (1.06) 
7 -0.23 -12.23 -14.05 -0.73 15.01 
 
(2.01) (712.31) (734.84) (2.13) (610.31) 
Constant 
    
-1.98*** 
 
    
(0.31) 
 
Cut Points 
-1.92*** 1.26*** -0.08 
 
-1.56*** 
 (0.22) (0.28) (0.21) 
 
(0.23) 
 -1.28*** 3.06*** 1.54*** 
 
-0.55* 
 (0.21) (0.33) (0.22) 
 
(0.22) 
 -0.37 4.51*** 3.70*** 
 
0.39 
 (0.20) (0.48) (0.32) 
 
(0.22) 
 0.88*** 5.62*** 5.91*** 
 
1.50*** 
 (0.20) (0.75) (0.74) 
 
(0.23) 
N 
 
711 711 711 697 573 
Model ologit ologit ologit logit ologit 
Notes: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates followed by standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, 
*** p<0.001, based on two-tailed tests. Outcome variables are: total votes for major-party, minor-party, and 
independent candidates; straight-ticket voting, and total votes for candidates from favored party. The outcomes 
include votes in the presidential, MP, women MP, and chair contests.  Partisan cues compares Treatments 1 and 4 
with 3 and 5. The causal variables are dichotomous. Models 1 and 2 include all subjects. Model 3 includes partisans.  
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Major party Minor party Independent 
Straight  
ticket 
Party-ID  
match 
       
Partisan Cues 
 
0.68*** -0.09 -0.65*** 0.92*** 0.63*** 
 
(0.14) (0.20) (0.15) (0.19) (0.15) 
 
 
     
Photographs 
 
-0.22 -0.22 0.21 -0.48* -0.14 
 
(0.14) (0.20) (0.15) (0.19) (0.15) 
Age 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01* -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female 
 -0.23 0.25 0.04 -0.27 -0.29 
 (0.14) (0.20) (0.15) (0.19) (0.15) 
Constant 
 
   -1.37***  
 
   (0.29)  
Cut Points 
-2.36*** 1.12*** -0.52*  -1.84*** 
 (0.24) (0.32) (0.23)  (0.26) 
 -1.71*** 2.88*** 1.09***  -0.84*** 
 (0.23) (0.36) (0.24)  (0.24) 
 -0.80*** 4.34*** 3.19***  0.09 
 (0.22) (0.51) (0.32)  (0.24) 
 0.45* 5.44*** 5.36***  1.20*** 
 (0.22) (0.77) (0.74)  (0.25) 
N 
 
711 711 711 711 574 
Model ologit ologit ologit logit ologit 
Notes: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates followed by standard errors in parentheses.  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, 
*** p<0.001, based on two-tailed tests.  Outcome variables are: total votes for major-party, minor-party, and 
independent candidates; straight-ticket voting, and total votes for candidates from favored party.  The outcomes 
include votes in the presidential, MP, women MP, and chair contests.  Partisan cues compares Treatments 1 and 4 
with 3 and 5.  Models 1 and 2 include all subjects.  Model 3 includes only partisans. 
 
Justification 
 
This Appendix provides a robustness check on our main strategy for resolving the unanticipated 
interaction between the Kish grid selection of subjects within a household and the assignment of 
treatments (see Appendix B for a detailed explanation).  The analyses in this Appendix use the 
full sample of subjects, including those that did and did not have an equal chance of being 
assigned to comparable treatments. The first table shows the results of analyses that include 
controls for those attributes that are related to subjects’ location on the Kish grid and thus their 
selection into the study and assignment to treatments.  We include dummy variables for 
household size and the subject’s age ranking in the household (which is the same as the list order 
on the Kish grid).  The second table shows the results of analyses that include controls for the 
two observable characteristics that are unbalanced in the full sample:  age and sex.   
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Appendix D: Balance Check Results and Justification 
Variable Range 
Panel 1:  Mean per treatment Panel 2:  Mean per group 
1 2 3 4 5 p No 
Parties 
Parties p 
Demographics 
   Age 
 
18-88 37.57 37.84 38.42 36.48 35.88 .70 37.05 37.50 .72 
   Female 0-1 .28 .32 .46 .62 .66 .00 .44 .48 .38 
   Wealth index 0-5 1.76 1.60 1.64 1.50 1.54 .42 1.63 1.59 .71 
Ethnicity 
   Iteso 
 
0-1 .65 .65 .60 .63 .66 .91 .64 .63 .93 
   Kumam 0-1 .35 .35 .40 .37 .34 .91 .36 .37 .93 
Past political participation 
   Voted 2006? 
 
0-1 .74 .69 .72 .65 .63 .36 .69 .68 .66 
   Used assistance when voting? 0-1 .16 .11 .08 .14 .13 .64 .15 .11 .25 
   NRM presidential vote 0-1 .55 .55 .49 .54 .48 .90 .55 .50 .48 
   FDC presidential vote 0-1 .43 .45 .49 .42 .48 .89 .43 .48 .34 
Education & knowledge 
   Education 
 
1-9 3.85 3.51 3.79 3.45 3.45 .19 3.66 3.58 .55 
   Political knowledge index 0-8 5.24 5.03 4.95 4.27 5.00 .17 4.78 4.96 .50 
   Listen radio news (frequency) 0-3 2.03 2.05 1.80 1.70 1.87 .15 1.87 1.89 .88 
   Read newspaper (frequency) 0-3 .31 .34 .23 .14 .41 .03 .23 .32 .14 
   Watch TV news (frequency) 0-3 .04 .05 .13 .08 .08 .25 .06 .09 .21 
Notes:  The right-hand column in Panel 1 reports results from tests of relationships between variables of interest and the four treatment categories.  For these 
checks, ANOVA tests were conducted for continuous variables, Chi-square tests for categorical and dummy variables, and Kruskal-Wallis tests for ordinal 
variables.  Panel 2 reports means for treatments categorized into party and no-party groups.  For comparisons between party and no-party groups, t-tests are 
conducted for continuous variables, Chi-square tests for categorical and dummy variables, and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests for ordinal variables.   
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We report on balance checks for fourteen variables, which we included because we did 
not expect them to be affected by the treatments.  These variables included demographic 
measures (i.e., sex, age, wealth), ethnic dummies (i.e., Iteso, Kumam), and past political leanings 
(i.e., 2006 presidential vote for NRM and FDC).  
We also check for balance on variables that might have affected individuals’ abilities to 
complete ballots of different types, such as education, participation in the 2006 election, need for 
assistance when casting a ballot in the 2006 election, and consumption of various types of mass 
media (i.e., radio, newspaper, and television).  We also check for balance on an index measuring 
political knowledge, which we construct from measures of subjects’ abilities to 1) identify 
whether or not a presidential candidate needs a majority to win (he/she does); 2) name the Soroti 
County Member of Parliament (Peter Omolo); 3) name the Soroti District chairperson (Stephen 
Ochola); 4) identify the party with the most seats in Parliament (the NRM); and 5-8) name 
whether the DP, NRM, FDC, and UPC were each members of the opposition coalition, Inter-
Party Cooperation (from that list, only FDC was). 
Question wordings for variables included in the balance checks were as follows:   
 
Age 
How old are you? 
 
Education 
What is the highest level of education that you have completed?  [Options not read] 
 
Wealth 
I am going to read you a list of items.  Please tell me which ones your household owns.  A radio?  
A television?  A mobile phone?  A bicycle or motorcycle?  A motor vehicle? 
 
Ethnicity 
What is your tribal identity?  [Options not read] 
 
2006 Participation 
Did you vote in the national elections in 2006? 
 
2006 Vote Assistance 
Did you bring someone into the voting booth with you to help you vote in 2006? 
 
2006 Vote 
What was the party of the candidate you voted for for president in 2006?  [Options not read] 
 
Political Knowledge 
Do you happen to know what percentage of votes a candidate has to win in this country to be 
elected to the presidency?  Does the candidate have to receive more than half of all the votes 
cast, or just one more than any other candidate? 
 
And do you know who is the current Member of Parliament for this constituency?  [Options not 
read] 
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Can you tell me what party has the most seats (members) in the Parliament at the moment?  
[Options not read] 
 
Do you know the name of your District Chairperson?  [Options not read] 
 
I am going to read you a list of parties.  Can you please tell me which ones are members of the 
Inter-Party Cooperation, or IPC. 
 --Democratic Party, or DP 
 --Forum for Democratic Change, or FDC 
 --National Resistance Movement, or NRM 
 --Uganda People’s Congress, or UPC 
 
Radio News Consumption 
Do you ever get your news from the radio?  [If “yes,” follow up]:  I am going to read you a list of 
radio stations.  For each, please tell me how often you listened to it in the last week.  Did you 
listen to it every day, almost every day, one or two days, or not at all this week? 
 
Newspaper News Consumption 
This last week, about how often do you think you got news from a newspaper?  Do you think 
you got news from a newspaper every day, almost every day, one or two days, or not at all this 
week? 
 
Television News Consumption 
This last week, about how often do you think you got news from television? Do you think you 
got news from television every day, almost every day, one or two days, or not at all this week? 
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Appendix E: Descriptive Statistics, Coding Rules, and Question Wording for Tests of Main 
Hypothesis 
 
 
Dependent Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Major-party candidates 429 2.65 1.31 0 4 
Minor-party candidates 429 0.18 0.49 0 4 
Independent candidates 429 0.68 0.79 0 4 
Straight-ticket voting 429 0.20 .40 0 1 
Party-ID Match 340 2.20 1.37 0 4 
 
 
Major-party candidates.  Dependent variable sums the total number of votes for major-party 
(NRM and FDC) candidates in the presidential, MP, women MP, and chairperson contests.  
Missing votes are coded as 0.  Variable includes all subjects. 
 
Minor-party candidates.  Dependent variable sums the total number of votes for minor-party 
(UPC, DP, PDP, PPP, and UFA) candidates in the presidential, MP, women MP, and chairperson 
contests.  Missing votes are coded as 0.  Variable includes all subjects. 
 
Independent candidates.  Dependent variable sums the total number of votes for independent 
candidates in the presidential, MP, women MP, and chairperson contests.  Missing votes are 
coded as 0.  Variable includes all subjects. 
 
Straight-ticket voting.  Dependent variable is coded as 1 if subject voted for candidates from the 
same party in all four races and 0 otherwise.  Subjects coded as 0 include those who voted split-
ticket ballots, voted for at least one independent candidate, or did not vote in at least one contest.  
Variable includes all subjects. 
  
Party-ID match.  Dependent variable sums the total number of votes in the presidential, MP, 
women MP, and chairperson contests for candidates whose party affiliation matched a subject’s 
self-identified party identification.  Missing votes among self-identified partisans were coded as 
0.  The analysis includes only those subjects who reported feeling close to a party.   
 
The question wording for subject party-ID was: “I am going to read you a list of parties. Please 
tell me to which ONE you feel closest, or don’t you feel close to any?” [Options read]. 
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Appendix F: Means by treatment and difference of means between treatments 
 A B C D E F 
 
No Candidate 
Photographs 
 
Candidate  
Photographs 
 
 
No Partisan 
Cues 
Partisan 
Cues 
 
No Partisan 
Cues 
Partisan 
Cues 
 
 
Treatment 
1 
Treatment 
3 
Compare 
1 vs 3 
Treatment 
4 
Treatment 
5 
Compare 
4 vs 5 
         
Major party 2.46 2.87 0.41 ** 2.49 2.78 0.29 * 
 (1.32) (1.33) z=2.72 (1.26) (1.29) z=2.04 
 n=115 n=107   n=103 n=104   
         
Minor party 0.18 0.26 0.08  0.17 0.12 -0.05  
 (0.47) (0.62) z=0.85 (0.47) (0.38) z=0.88 
 n=115 n=107   n=103 n=104   
         
Independent 0.74 0.50 -0.24 ** 0.89 0.61 -0.29 ** 
 (0.75) (0.72) z=-2.68 (0.85) (0.79) z=-2.68 
 n=115 n=107   n=103 n=104   
         
Straight ticket 0.17 0.34 0.16 ** 0.10 0.20 0.10 * 
 (0.38) (0.47) χ2=7.76 (0.30) (0.40) χ2=4.47  
 n=115 n=107   n=103 n=104   
         
Party-ID match 1.96 2.60 0.65 ** 2.01 2.26 0.24  
 (1.42) (1.40) z=3.01 (1.19) (1.38) z=1.48 
 n=92 n=81   n=85 n=82   
         
Notes: Cell entries for columns A, B, D, and E represent mean values with standard deviations in parentheses.  Cell 
entries for columns C and F represent difference of means followed by the relevant z or χ
2
 statistic.  We conducted a 
Chi-square test for the dichotomous outcome ‘straight ticket’, and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests for all other 
outcomes, since they are ordinal.  Significant differences are marked as follows: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  
Outcome variables are: total votes for major-party, minor-party, and independent candidates; straight-ticket voting, 
and total votes for candidates from favored party.  The outcomes include votes in the presidential, MP, women MP, 
and chair contests.  The results for Party-ID match include only partisan subjects, while both partisan and 
nonpartisan subjects are included for the others.  Treatments 1 and 3 do not include candidate photographs.  
Treatments 4 and 5 do include candidate photographs.  Treatments 1 and 4 do not include partisan cues.  Treatments 
3 and 5 include partisan cues.   
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Appendix G: Robustness Checks 
 
Missing data for vote choice: Predicting missing data and alternative specifications for missing data 
             
 Marked ballot Drop observations with four contests unmarked Drop observations with one or more contests unmarked 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
All four 
contests 
unmarked 
Number of 
contests 
marked 
Major 
party 
Minor 
party 
Independent 
Straight-
ticket 
Party-ID 
match 
Major 
party 
Minor 
party 
Independent 
Straight-
ticket 
Party-ID 
match 
                          
Party Cues -0.33 0.13 0.64*** -0.02 -0.84*** 0.84** 0.60** 0.72*** -0.04 -0.85*** 0.88*** 0.57** 
 
(0.33) (0.26) (0.19) (0.28) (0.20) (0.26) (0.20) (0.20) (0.28) (0.20) (0.26) (0.21) 
             
Photos -0.07 -0.01 -0.15 -0.50 0.32 -0.70** -0.28 -0.15 -0.48 0.33 -0.69** -0.31 
 
(0.32) (0.26) (0.19) (0.28) (0.19) (0.26) (0.20) (0.19) (0.29) (0.20) (0.26) (0.21) 
             
Constant -2.01*** 
    
-1.40*** 
    
-1.32*** 
 
 
(0.26) 
    
(0.22) 
    
(0.22) 
 
             
Cut Points 
 
-2.14*** -3.66*** 1.40*** -0.51** 
 
-2.01*** -3.86*** 1.37*** -0.56** 
 
-2.12*** 
  
(0.24) (0.38) (0.22) (0.17) 
 
(0.23) (0.43) (0.23) (0.18) 
 
(0.24) 
             
 
 
-2.06*** -2.05*** 3.31*** 1.34*** 
 
-0.95*** -2.22*** 3.23*** 1.28*** 
 
-0.98*** 
  
 
(0.23) (0.21) (0.35) (0.18) 
 
(0.19) (0.23) (0.35) (0.19) 
 
(0.19) 
             
 
 
-1.94*** -0.66*** 4.63*** 3.68*** 
 
0.14 -0.73*** 4.55*** 3.62*** 
 
0.10 
 
 
(0.23) (0.17) (0.61) (0.38) 
 
(0.18) (0.17) (0.61) (0.38) 
 
(0.19) 
             
 
 
-1.58*** 0.86*** 5.73*** 5.78*** 
 
1.39*** 0.78*** 5.66*** 5.72*** 
 
1.29*** 
  
(0.22) (0.17) (1.02) (1.01) 
 
(0.20) (0.18) (1.02) (1.01) 
 
(0.20) 
             
N 429 429 386 386 386 386 317 359 359 359 359 300 
Model logit ologit ologit ologit ologit logit ologit ologit ologit ologit logit ologit 
             
Notes: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates followed by standard errors in parentheses.  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, based on two-tailed tests.   
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Alternative measures or coding for vote choice 
     
 Major party Straight-ticket Party-ID match 
 
(13) (14) (15) (16) 
 
FDC Party match between 
presidential and down-ballot votes 
Drop if impossible given 
presidential vote 
Drop if impossible given  
party ID 
     
     
Party Cues 0.31 0.65*** 0.89*** 0.61** 
 
(0.17) (0.18) (0.25) (0.20) 
     
Photos 0.06 -0.12 -0.70** -0.21 
 
(0.17) (0.17) (0.25) (0.19) 
     
Constant 
  
-1.51*** 
 
   
(0.22) 
 
     
Cut Points -0.36* -0.83*** 
 
-1.52*** 
 
(0.15) (0.16) 
 
(0.20) 
     
 0.37* 0.42** 
 
-0.70*** 
 (0.15) (0.16) 
 
(0.18) 
     
 1.16*** 1.65*** 
 
0.29 
 (0.16) (0.18) 
 
(0.18) 
     
 2.19*** 
  
1.50*** 
 (0.19) 
  
(0.19) 
     
N 429 429 414 335 
Model ologit ologit logit ologit 
     Notes: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates followed by standard errors in parentheses.  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, based on two-tailed tests..   
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Vote choice by contest: Presidential, member of parliament, women member of parliament, and local council chairperson 
             
  
Major party 
  
Minor party 
  
Independent 
 
 
(17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) 
 
President  MP 
Women  
MP 
Chair-
person 
President  MP 
Women  
MP 
Chair-
person 
President 
1
 MP 
Women  
MP 
Chair-
person 
             
             
Party Cues 0.10 0.63** 0.48* 0.34 
# 
0.47 -0.04 -0.90 0.60 
 
-0.74** -0.38 
#
 -0.55* 
 
(0.26) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.47) (0.41) (0.60) (0.49) 
 
(0.26) (0.21) (0.27) 
             
Photos 0.05 -0.10 0.02 -0.10 -0.36 -0.36 -1.76* -0.05 
 
0.29 0.28 0.13 
 
(0.26) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.47) (0.42) (0.77) (0.47) 
 
(0.25) (0.21) (0.26) 
             
Constant 1.59*** 0.33 
#
 -0.18 0.49** -3.11*** -2.60*** -2.52*** -3.38*** 
 
-1.33*** -0.66*** -1.44*** 
 
(0.22) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.40) (0.33) (0.35) (0.44) 
 
(0.21) (0.17) (0.21) 
             
N 429 429 429 429 429 429 429 429 
 
429 429 429 
Model logit logit logit Logit logit logit logit logit 
 
logit logit logit 
             Notes: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates followed by standard errors in parentheses.  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, based on two-tailed tests.  
1
 Only 5 subjects voted for the independent candidate in the presidential elections, so results are omitted 
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Appendix H:  Descriptive Statistics, Coding Rules, and Question Wording for Robustness 
Checks 
 
Dependent Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Four contests empty 429 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Number of contests marked 429 3.51 1.23 0 4 
Major Party:   Drop observations with four contests empty 386 2.94 1.02 0 4 
Minor Party:   Drop observations with four contests empty 386 0.20 0.52 0 4 
Independent:   Drop observations with four contests empty 386 0.76 0.80 0 4 
Straight ticket: Drop observations with four contests empty 386 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Party ID:          Drop observations with four contests empty 317 2.36 1.28 0 4 
Major Party:   Drop observations with one or more contests empty 359 3.01 0.99 0 4 
Minor Party:   Drop observations with one or more contests empty 359 0.21 0.53 0 4 
Independent:   Drop observations with one or more contests empty 359 0.79 0.81 0 4 
Straight ticket: Drop observations with one or more contests empty 359 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Party ID:          Drop observations with one or more contests empty 300 2.38 1.28 0 4 
Major Party: FDC 429 1.47 1.42 0 4 
Straight-ticket: Party match presidential and down-ballot 429 1.40 1.08 0 3 
Straight-ticket: Drop if impossible given presidential vote 414 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Party-ID match: Drop if impossible given party ID 335 2.23 1.36 0 4 
Major Party: President 429 0.84 0.37 0 1 
Major Party: MP 429 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Major Party: Women MP 429 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Major Party: Chairperson 429 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Minor Party: President 429 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Minor Party: MP 429 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Minor Party: Women MP 429 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Minor Party: Chairperson 429 0.04 0.21 0 1 
Independent: President 429 0.00 0.07 0 1 
Independent: MP 429 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Independent: Women MP 429 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Independent: Chairperson 429 0.17 0.37 0 1 
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Four contests empty.  Dependent variable records totally empty ballots.  Subjects were coded as 
0 if they marked a vote choice for one or more contests, and 1 if they marked no vote choices for 
all four contests (president, MP, women MP, and chairperson).  Variable includes all subjects. 
 
Number of contests marked.  Dependent variable sums the number of contest (president, MP, 
women MP, and chairperson) in which a subject voted.  Variable includes all subjects. 
 
One or more contests empty.  Analysis is restricted to only those subjects who voted in all four 
contests (president, MP, women MP, and chairperson), and thus have full ballots.  Subjects were 
coded as missing and dropped from the analysis if they did not vote in one or more contests. 
 
Major Party: FDC.  Dependent variable sums the total number of votes for FDC candidates in the 
presidential, MP, women MP and chairperson contests.  Missing votes are coded as 0.  Variable 
includes all subjects. 
 
Straight ticket: Party match between presidential and down-ballot votes.  Dependent variable 
sums the total number of votes for candidates in the MP, women MP, and chairperson contests 
with the same partisan affiliation as that of a subject’s presidential vote choice.  Subjects were 
coded as 3 if they voted for candidates from the same party in all races.  Subjects were coded as 
2 if the party of two of their down-ballot votes matched the party of their presidential vote.  
Subjects were coded as 1 if the party of one of their down-ballot votes matched the party of their 
presidential vote. Subjects were coded as 0 if the party of none of their down-ballot votes 
matched the party of their presidential vote.   
 
Straight ticket: Drop if straight-ticket voting was impossible given presidential vote.  Analysis is 
restricted to only those subjects who voted for the FDC, NRM, or UPC presidential candidates.  
Subjects who voted for the PDP, PPP, UFA, DP, or independent candidate for president, and 
those who did not record a vote choice for president, were dropped from the analysis.   
 
Party-ID match: Drop if party-id match was impossible given party ID.  Analysis is restricted to 
only those subjects who reported feeling close to the FDC, NRM, or UPC parties.  Subjects who 
reported feeling close to other parties, and those who did not report feeling close to a party, were 
dropped from the analysis.  
 
The question wording for subject party-ID was: “I am going to read you a list of parties. Please 
tell me to which ONE you feel closest, or don’t you feel close to any?” [Options read]. 
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Appendix I:  Descriptive Statistics, Coding Rules, and Question Wording for Analyses 
Referenced in Discussion Section 
 
Dependent Variable (Treatments 1, 3, 4, and 5) N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Former copartisan independents 324 0.34 0.58 0 2 
Non coethnic candidates in chairperson contest 424 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Non coethnic candidates in chairperson contest, cross-pressured only 167 0.56 0.50 0 1 
Know Partisanship All 429 9.86 6.07 0 23 
Know Partisanship Voted 429 1.85 1.17 0 3 
 
Former copartisan independents. Dependent variable sums the total number of votes in the MP, 
women MP, and chairperson contests for independent candidates who were formerly affiliated 
with a party that matched a subject’s self-identified party-ID.  The presidential race did not 
include candidates formerly affiliated with parties so it is not included in the analysis.  
Independent candidates were formally affiliated with only the NRM and FDC parties, so only 
those subjects who reported feeling close to the FDC or NRM parties are included in the 
analysis.  For subjects included in the analysis, missing votes were coded as 0.   
 
Non coethnic candidates in chairperson contest. Dependent variable records a vote for a non-
coethnic candidate in the chairperson contest.  Kumam subjects who voted an Iteso candidate 
and Iteso subjects who voted for a Kumam candidate were coded as 1, and all other Kumam and 
Iteso subjects were coded as 0.  Variable includes only Kumam and Iteso subjects.  For subjects 
included in the analysis, missing votes were coded as 0.   
 
Cross-pressured subjects for chairperson contest.  Analysis is restricted to only those subjects 
who could vote for a copartisan or a coethnic candidate in the chairperson contest, but not both.  
In the chairperson contest, the NRM candidate was Kumam and the FDC candidate was Iteso.  
Subjects were cross-pressured if they were NRM partisans and Iteso, or they were FDC partisans 
and Kumam.   
 
Know Partisanship All: Dependent variable sums the total number of candidates whose partisan 
affiliation or independent status a subject correctly identified.  The variable sums responses 
across all 23 candidates in the MP, women MP, and chairperson contests.  For each candidate, 
correct responses were coded as 1, and incorrect, don’t know, and missing responses were coded 
as 0.   
 
Know Partisanship Voted: Dependent variable sums the total number of candidates whose 
partisan affiliation or independent status a subject correctly identified.  The variable sums 
responses about only those candidates for whom a subject voted in the MP, women MP, and 
chairperson contests.  For each supported candidate, correct responses were coded as 1, and 
incorrect, don’t know, and missing responses were coded as 0.  Missing votes were also coded as 
0. 
 
The question wording for know partisanship was: “What would you say is the political party of 
this candidate, or is the candidate an independent?” [Options not read] 
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Dependent Variable (Literate subjects in treatments 1 and 2) N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Major-party candidates 193 2.46 1.35 0 4 
Minor-party candidates 193 0.26 0.58 0 4 
Independent candidates 193 0.70 0.78 0 3 
Straight-ticket voting 193 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Party-ID Match 160 1.96 1.43 0 4 
 
 
Dependent Variable (Literate subjects in treatments 2 and 3) N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Major-party candidates 169 2.53 1.44 0 4 
Minor-party candidates 169 0.33 0.68 0 4 
Independent candidates 169 0.58 0.78 0 3 
Straight-ticket voting 169 0.25 0.44 0 1 
Party-ID Match 137 2.22 1.49 0 4 
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Appendix J: Effects of Party Names and Effects of Party Symbols, among Literates 
 
Major party Minor party Independent 
Straight  
ticket 
Party-ID  
match 
 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Party Names -0.36  0.65 -0.40  0.41  0.13 
 
(0.26) (0.36) (0.27) (0.37) (0.28) 
      
Constant 
   
-1.64*** 
 
    
(0.28) 
 
Cut Points -1.96***  1.65*** -0.30  -1.21*** 
 
(0.25) (0.28) (0.20)  (0.23) 
 -1.40***  3.83***  1.50***  -0.32 
 (0.22) (0.48) (0.24)  (0.20) 
 -0.46*  4.95***  3.67***   0.55** 
 (0.19) (0.75) (0.52)  (0.21) 
  0.85***  5.65***    1.45*** 
 (0.20) (1.03)   (0.24) 
N 193 193 193 193 160 
Model ologit ologit ologit logit ologit 
 
 
 6 7 8 9 10 
      
Party symbols  0.69 * -0.04 -0.69 *  0.43  0.77 * 
 
(0.28) (0.36) (0.31) (0.35) (0.31) 
      
Constant 
   
-1.28*** 
 
    
(0.25) 
 
Cut Points -1.43***  1.12*** -0.01  -1.17*** 
 
(0.24) (0.24) (0.21)  (0.25) 
 -0.83***  2.75***  1.62***  -0.25 
 (0.21) (0.36) (0.26)  (0.22) 
 -0.05  4.41***  3.46***   0.31 
 (0.20) (0.73) (0.52)  (0.22) 
  0.98***     1.36*** 
 (0.21)    (0.25) 
N 169 169 169 169 137 
Model ologit ologit ologit logit ologit 
Notes: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates followed by standard errors in parentheses.  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, 
*** p<0.001, based on two-tailed tests.  Outcome variables are: total votes for major-party, minor-party, and 
independent candidates; straight-ticket voting, and total votes for candidates from favored party.  The outcomes 
include votes in the presidential, MP, women MP, and chair contests.  Party names compares Treatment 1 (candidate 
names only) with Treatment 2 (candidate names and party names).  Party symbols compares Treatment 2 with 
Treatment 3 (candidate names, party names, and party symbols).  Only literate subjects are included (those with at 
least some primary education).  Columns 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9 include all literate subjects.  Columns 5 and 10 
include only literate subjects who are partisans. 
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